While NASA established the investigation board and selected its initial members the CAIB would have its own independent authority and would not answer to NASA. Procedures were established where the NASA engineers would investigate the accident while the CAIB would 'keep them honest' and ensure that they weren't avoiding any difficult issues or trying to sweep anything under the table.
Even though the foam hitting the left wing after launch was an obvious cause why and how the accident occurred was just as important. In addition the investigators wanted to ensure that they didn't ignore any other possibilities. It would be a long and comprehensive investigation.
While waiting for engineering data to come in the CAIB examined NASA's management structure and its culture - while the mechanical reasons for the accident were important, it was just as important to find the underlying reasons for why NASA let whatever went wrong happen.
From left to right seated are board members G. Scott Hubbard, Dr. James N. Hallock, Dr. Sally Ride, Board Chairman Admiral (retired) Hal Gehman, Steven Wallace, Dr. John Logsdon, and Dr. Sheila Widnall. Standing from left to right are Dr. Douglas D. Osheroff, Maj. General John Barry, Rear Admiral Stephen Turcotte, Brig. General Duane Deal, Maj. General Kenneth W. Hess and Roger E. Tetrault. Photo by the CAIB.
| Douglas Osheroff poses for a photo by the author. |
CAIB member Stephen Turcotte examines a wing leading edge panel. |
An unflown simulated RCC panel from the prototype shuttle Enterprise. |
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The E208 video from Cocoa Beach and E212 video from the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station which NASA engineers had to examine during the mission.
This computer enhanced video was generated after the accident. It shows the foam falling off and hitting the wing in far more detail.

This launch photo shows where the foam fell off of the bipod 81 seconds later and where the bipod hit the leading edge of Columbia's left wing.