Behind the Scenes -

How Mission Control Reacted During the Mission

The day after a shuttle launch an engineering team examines all of the available video and film from tracking cameras. It's a standard procedure after every shuttle launch because it can provide information of use during the mission as well as future flights. For example on the STS-93 mission there was a slight shortfall in the performance of one of the main engines. Examination of the launch footage showed a bright spot on the inside of one of the engines indicating that there was a damaged area where hydrogen was leaking directly into the nozzle. There's generally more better quality footage for daytime launches.

On STS-107 engineers were shocked to see a piece of something - either ice or debris - fall off of the External Tank and hit Columbia's left wing. Two cameras spotted the debris, the E208 soft focused camera in Cocoa Beach and E212 camera from the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. Over the next eleven days engineers would study that video in detail to try to determine how it affected Columbia.


A team of engineers from Boeing tried to determine how much damage the foam caused to Columbia's wing. Their primary data was the size of the foam as determined by the video from the tracking cameras, how fast the foam hit the wing, and the known density of the foam. Their primary analytical tool was 'Crater', a simple computer program which predicted how much damage small amounts of foam would cause to the shuttle's tiles.

The Debris Assessment team produced three reports for the Mission Evaluation Room.

Debris Assessment Team Report January 21
Debris Assessment Team Report January 23
Debris Assessment Team Report January 24


Thumbnail DSC00713 MER.jpg The Mission Evaluation Room (MER) is a Mission Control team which performs off-line analysis during missions. It reports to the Mission Management Team.

The MER produces daily reports on the status of the shuttle's systems and any problems being worked. The foam strike was mentioned in three of those reports.

Author Philip Chien was given a copy of the Flight Day 12 Mission Evaluation Room report which cleared the foam on January 29, three days before the accident. After the accident NASA released all of the MER reports. In the original flight day 12 report the RCC is called "Radial Carbon-Carbon" but in the version released by NASA after the accident it's been corrected to "Reinforced Carbon-Carbon"

The STS-107 daily Mission Evaluation Room Reports.


The Mission Management Team (MMT) met five times during the mission. After the accident this was criticized because the flight rules say the MMT is supposed to meet every day but it had become common practice for the MMT to meet only occasionally if things were going well on the shuttle.

Thumbnail DSC00687 MMT room.jpg The MMT room.

Thumbnail DSC00689 MMT room Milt Heflin.jpg Chief Flight Director Milt Heflin in the MMT room with the Challenger and Columbia plaques.

Transcripts of the MMT meetings and recordings were not released until six months after the accident.

MMT chair Linda Ham brought up the foam strike analysis during the January 21 meeting. Her comments 'and really there's nothing we can do about it' were taken out of context after the accident.

Direct links to each MMT meeting's transcript and the media opportunity NASA had six months after the accident with preselected media.

  • January 17
  • January 21
  • January 24
  • January 27
  • January 30
  • Press Roundtable


    Photos by author Philip Chien.

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